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Abstract. The aim of this study is to find out if the concentration of the biggest shareholder, the control rights and the ratio of
cash flow rights-control rights of the controlling shareholders contributed to profitability. This study uses purposive sampling
technique in collecting the data and linear panel regression in analysing the panel data. The result of this study shows that the
ownership concentration of the biggest shareholders has positive impact to company profitability as big shareholders have
bigger incentive and thus better chance to do supervision upon the management. The study also found that the control rights
concentration of controlling shareholders have negative effect to profitability since more concentrated power of the controlling
shareholders made the shareholders position stronger and may incline them to gain individual profit which in turn will reduce
the company’s profit. On the contrary, higher ratio of cash flow rights to-control rights contributed positively to profitability
because higher cash flow rights will tend to prevent the controlling shareholders from expropriating the company’s assets.
Keywords: ownership structure, controlling shareholder, profitability

INTRODUCTION
Shareholder ownership and financial performance
of companies have been a major issue in understanding the effectiveness of the corporate governance
(CG) mechanism. According to Shleifer and Vishny (1996), companies residing in good CG circles
are more capable of resolving conflicts of interest
between the owners (principal) and management
(agents) of the company. Berley and Means (1932)
states that such conflicts of interest occur due to
evenly distributed share ownerships among small
shareholders, whereas the administration of the
company is in the hands of the management. In such
cases, the shareholders of companies whose ownership is evenly distributed are often called as ‘outsiders’ while the management ‘insiders’ (Cueto 2007).
Asian and Latin American countries tend to have
concentrated share ownership, as opposed to evenly
distributed ownerships (Cueto 2007). Conceptually,
concentrated ownerships are able to increase the company profitability as supervision of the management
of the company is rigid (Earle et al. 2004). Syafruddin (2006) states that as ownership concentration increases, the company profitability increases, in comparison to a company with distributed ownerships.
Based on the above, one of the formulating variables
of the ownership structure of a company which can
be analysed is: share ownership concentration and
its effects to the company profitability.
Share ownership concentration is calculated by
share ownership percentage of the biggest share-

holder in the company ownership structure (Earle et
al., 2004). Share ownership concentration variable
reflects whether or not share ownership of a company is relatively distributed. This affects supervision
to the administration of the company. Relatively
distributed ownership may cause loose supervision
of the management of the company. Such is caused
by the inability of the shareholders to influence the
management in the company’s operational decision
making, thus causing negligence of the management
as the manager is responsible for making investment
decisions using capitals owned by the company,
which in turn affects the investment return of the investors (Earle et al. 2004).
Joh (2001) found that companies with low ownership concentration, calculated by share ownership
percentage of the biggest shareholder, have lower
profitability. Earle et al. (2004) also found strong
evidence that concentrated ownership has positive
effects to profitability, which means higher Return
on Equity (ROE), whereas Tribo (2002) found that
the Return on Asset (ROA) of a company slightly
increases due to 1-2 of the biggest shareholders,
but decreases when there are more than two biggest
shareholders (Earle et al. 2004).
In a study on separation between owners and
company managers in nine Asian countries (Hong
Kong, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia,
Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand), it
is found that Indonesian companies are characterized by highly concentrated ownership, where such
ownership concentration is due to family or groups
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of family ownership of a company (Claessens et al.,
2000). Based on a study by Claessens et al. (2000),
regardless of distributed ownership, another ownership structure formation variable is incentive to expropriate, i.e. willingness of controlling shareholders to expropriate company assets. This variable is
measured by viewing the controlling shareholders
rights. According to La Porta et al. (2002), controlling shareholders are shareholders who own at least
ten per cent of the total shares. Earle et al. (2004)
states that controlling shareholder is the biggest
shareholder of a company. This view is shared in
Claessens et al. (1999).
In addition, the rights to share ownership, according to Joh (2001), are control rights/voting rights and
cash flow rights. According to Joh (2001), the presence of controlling shareholders will reduce agency
issues between the management and shareholders,
but nonetheless will start agency issues between
controlling shareholders and minority shareholders.
In general, expropriation is associated to the usage
of company assets for personal interests by the controlling shareholders (Fan and Wong 2000). The expropriation intensity can be seen through the condition
of profitability levels (Sari 2004). Apart from the control rights contentration of controlling shareholders,
another proxy used to understand the probability of
company resource expropriation, especially in countries where investor protection is weak, was done
by La Porta et al. (2002) by calculating the wedge
of segregating voting rights and dividend rights of
controlling shareholders through the investigation
of share ownership chain in its subsidiaries. While
Claessens et al. (1999) utilizes cash flow rights ratio
to control rights of controlling shareholders.
Fan and Wong (2000) states that controlling
shareholders have higher control rights than cash
flow rights. The urge for expropriation of the controlling shareholders increases in line with the wider
gap between control rights and cash flow rights.
Such is caused since wider control rights give more
power to expropriate, e.g. by not paying dividends,
transferring profits to other companies, or managing projects which does not maximize the profit of
the company (Utama 2006). Several literatures, such
as Earle et al. (2004), Joh (2001), Claessens et al.
(1999), and Claessens et al. (2000), find lower ROA
and ROE rates in companies with high gap between
control rights and cash flow rights of their controlling shareholders. ROA is used as the proxy for
profitability, because it calculates more accurately
the influence of share ownership structures toward
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the accounting profitability because it measures the
investor returns. ROE is used as the proxy for profitability because the main objective of a company
is to improve the prosperity of its shareholders, i.e.
securing the returns of invested capitals (Joh 2001).
Ownership structure can be viewed from various perspectives in order to show different empirical evidences based on the used variable of ownership structure. Cueto (2007) studied ownership
structure as a CG mechanism in Latin American
countries which has high ownership concentrations.
CG mechanism affects the value of a company and
market liquidity. In the study, Cueto states that controlling shareholders divert company resources for
private interests, emphasizing on the differences
between control rights with cash flow rights. Cueto
also studied the motivation of outside investors who
are participating in financing company activities.
Earle et al. (2004), on the other hand, uses panel
data to measure the effects of ownership concentration to company financial performance listed in the
Budapest Stock Exchange, Hungary. The results suggest that concentrated ownership influences company
profitability (ROE). However, significant profitability increase depends greatly on the size of the biggest
shareholders, and if there are several blockheadings,
then the profitability increase is not as great as that
of one major shareholder. Therefore, marginal effects of additional blockheadings are negative.
Gedajlovic and Shapiro (1998) studied 334 companies listed in Japan between 1986 and 1991, and concluded that ownership concentration in non-financial
and financial companies has positive effects to ROA
(Pranoto 2009). Mitton (2002) studied 389 companies
in Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand, which suffered from the 1997-1998 financial
crisis, by using disclosure quality, ownership structure, and company diversification as the independent
variables and company financial performance as the
dependent variable. This study shows that CG frailness in the countries taken as samples worsened the
then current financial crisis, which further urged
controlling shareholders to expropriate the rights of
the minority shareholders.
In a study on separation between owners and
company managers in nine Asian countries (Hong
Kong, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia,
Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand), it
is found that more than two thirds of the companies are controlled by a single shareholder. A perfect separation of shares between the managers of
the company and the shareowners is rarely found in
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those countries (Claessens et al. 2000). Kapelyushnikov (2000) reports a non-linear relation between
ownership concentration and company financial performance, where companies with the best financial
performance are those with insignificant ownership
concentration. On the other hand, Sari (2004) studied the influence of ownership concentration of the
biggest shareholders toward public ownership, and
found negative relations between such shareholders
and company ROA and no relations whatsoever to
Tobin’s Q. It is concluded that the costs incurred by
such shareholders are greater than the benefits the
company could achieve.
Claessens and Djankov (1999) use the data from
706 Czechoslovakian companies between 1992 and
1997. They used profitability as variable and labour
productivity as company performance indicator. Empirical test results show that the lower the distributed
ownership of a company, the higher the profitability
and productivity of its workforce. Dennis and Dennis
(1994) use data from 72 American companies and
found that there are no performance differences in
companies with controlling shareholders and companies without them (Utama 2006). Financial performance variables used are ROE, ROA, operating
income to asset, Tobin’s Q, and market to book ratio.
From the description above, the main issue which
discussed will adopt several studies which have been
carried out previously by Claessens et al. (1999),
Earle et al. (2004), Joh (2001), and Sari (2004), assuming that ownership structure, with ownership
concentration variable and incentive to expropriate,
affects company profitability as it determines company operations supervision and the relations between the biggest (controller) and minor shareholders; the former is part of the management which decides which profitable operational decisions shall be
taken. Such decisions will in turn determine whether
it is profitable for every shareholder or for the biggest shareholders as controlling shareholders. The
aims of the study are: (1) to analyse the positive influences of share ownership concentration by proxy
of the biggest shareholders’ ownership to company
profitability; (2) to analyse negative influences of
expropriating incentive toward company profitability by proxy of control rights concentration of controlling shareholder; and, (3) to analyse positive influences of expropriating incentive toward company
profitability by proxy of cash flow rights - control
rights ratio of controlling shareholders.
METHODOLOGY
This study employs a quantitative approach, tests
the relations among hypothesized variables, and
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explain whether the ownership structure variables
influence company profitability. In this study, obtained data are secondary data, consisting of company financial statements and annual reports. The
secondary data are: (1) financial statements and annual reports obtained from the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) and supplemented with data from the
Indonesian Capital Market Directory (ICMD); and,
(2) bibliographic research. In this study, the target
populations are companies listed in the IDX from
1st January 2004 to 31st December 2008, totalling to
335 companies. The entire population is not entirely
analysed due to cost, energy, and time limitations.
As such, sampling is considered a representation of
a population (Cooper and Schindler 2006). Of the
335 companies, 69 companies are listed under the
financial industry. The companies submit their annual reports and financial statements in succession
and comprehensively within the period. There are
104 companies’ reports and statements which are
downloadable from the IDX website. The annual
reports enclose capital shares and share ownership
of 66 consolable companies, 11 outlier companies,
and 55 non-outlier companies. The total number of
samples in this study is 55 companies.
Specifically, samples for this study are obtained
by using purposive sampling tehnique. Purposive
sampling is defined as a sampling process based
on several criteria (Cooper and Schindler 2006).
The sample criteria set forth in this study are:
1) companies listed in the IDX between 2004 to
2008; 2) companies not listed under financial industry due to differences in: financial performance
measurement and financing structure, as general
companies listed under the financial industry employs greater third party funding, in addition to differences in investment opportunities (Pranoto 2009);
3) companies which submit their annual reports and
financial statements in succession and comprehensively within the period and are downloadable from
the IDX website; and, 4) the annual reports enclosing capital shares and share ownership in consolidated subsidiaries.
On the other hand, the data analysis methods employed in this study include descriptive statistics
analysis, panel data analysis, and classic assumption
tests. Quantitative study emphasizes on two types of
hypotheses, single variable hypothesis and causal
hypothesis, or multiple variable hypothesis (Cooper
and Schindler 2006). The proposed hypotheses of
the study are: Ha where each variable significantly
affects company profitability.
There are several empirical studies which support
the notion that concentrated ownership are able to
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics Summary
CONS?

CFR_CTR?
TR?

CTR?

LEV?

SIZE?

ROA?

ROE?

Average

0.477380

4.156651

0.844006

0.527782

14.03833

0.045960

0.094778

Median

0.509700

2.550000

0.903751

0.520000

14.34000

0.033300

0.081000

Maximum

0.928800

20.81000

2.817814

2.380000

18.33000

0.426400

0.586000

Minimum

0.061800

0.160000

-1.976711

0.030000

9.210000

-0.172900

-0.231000

Std. Dev.

0.204325

3.913009

0.478087

0.281192

1.771217

0.065552

0.121838

275
55

275
55

275
55

275
55

275
55

275
55

275
55

Observations
Cross sections
CONS
CTR
CFR_CTR
LEV
SIZE
ROA
ROE

= largest shareholder ownership concentration
= controlling shareholders control right concentration
= controlling shareholders control right cash flow rights-control rights ratio
= debt to asset total
= company asset total
= return on asset
= return on equity

increase company profitability since supervision of
the management of the company is rigid (Earle et al.
2004). Syafruddin (2006) states that as ownership
concentration increases, the company profitability
increases, in comparison to a company with distributed ownerships.
Ha1: Share ownership concentration positively affects company profitability.
Several literatures, such as Earle et al. (2004),
Joh (2001), Claessens et al. (1999), and Claessens et al. (2000), find lower ROA and ROE
rates in companies with high gap between the
control rights and cash flow rights controlling
shareholders.
Ha2:Controlling shareholders’ incentive to expropriate affects company profitability.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Table 1 is a summary of descriptive statistics of
each variable required in the model; the variables of
which are average value, maximum and minimum
value, and standard deviation, in other words, a summary of centralized and disseminated data.
As for company financial performance, the average sample of company profitability has an ROA of
4.59% and an ROE of 9.47%. The maximum value of
ROA and ROE are 4.26% and 5.86%, respectively.
In figure 1, it can be seen that the average ROE value
is slightly higher than that of ROA since the sample
companies utilizes lower equities in its operations,
thus the total equity is slightly lower than the total
asset and the equity returns is higher. Furthermore,

profitability tends to increase year in, year out, except in 2008, when there was global economic crisis
that affected the sample companies.
Share ownership in sample companies tend to
concentrate, averaging at 47.74%. According to Earle et al. (2004), Company ownership is considered
concentrated if the shareholders own at least 20% of
the total shares. The view is shared with Claessens
et al. (1999), that ownership concentration in Asian
countries, including Indonesia, is considered as
relatively highly concentrated, despite a drop in the
value since an ownership concentration study was
carried out by Claessens et al. (1999) between 1996
and 1998. The ownership concentration value at that
time reached 68.60%. The drop in concentration levels, perhaps, is due to the use of a smaller sample,
55 companies, compared to the study by Claessens
et al. (1999), which studied 176 Indonesian companies. In addition, the drop occured, perhaps, because
the biggest shareholders sold some of their shares in
order to diversify. Thus, the ownership structure accommodates more minor shareholders whose ownership is less than 5%.
The high level of ownership concentration is associated with a group of companies which are usually owned by one or more families. When a company goes public, the founder of the company usually
owns the majority of the shares, so that he can retain
the required share proportions to still be in charge
of the management of the company. The point is
shared with Claessens et al. (2000), who states that
companies in Indonesia tend to be controlled by
1 or 2 biggest shareholders. Moreover, the size of
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2004

2005

2006

2007

2004

2005

2006

2007

Figure 1. ROA and ROE Movement

Figure 2. Ownership Concentration Movements
the company is also a decisive factor in ownership
concentration levels, as there are assumptions that
the bigger the company, the more distributed is the
ownership.
In Figure 2, it can be seen that ownership concentration tends to be stable during the period of study.
Therefore, based on average CONS value in the
graph, it can be concluded that ownership concentration in sample companies tend to not be distributed and the relative ownership concentration does
not undergo significant changes during the period of
study.
The average and the minimum values of the controlling shareholders control rights concentration
variables are 4.16 and 0.16, respectively. CTR average year in, year out tends to increase, as seen in
Figure 3.
Claessens et al. (1999) postulates that controlling
shareholders enroot their control by means of a pyramid scheme, where share ownership of company A
constitutes ownership of shares of other companies
owned by A, or by cross holding, where each subsidiaries own shares of other companies. By using the

2008

2008
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Year

Year

pyramid structure and cross holding schemes, controlling shareholders accumulate their control rights
in the company either by direct ownership of a subsidiary or indirect ownership of other subsidiaries.
Control rights expand in proportion to the number
of subsidiaries and controlling share ownership in
the subsidiary. Controlling shareholders are said to
have control, in that they have the rights to make
decisions for the company if his ownership exceeds
10%.
The average value of CFR/CTR ratio variable is
0.84, slightly higher than the findings of Claessens
et al. (1999), which is 0.76. The higher ratio is perhaps due to the implementation of better company
administration procedures or economy. Joh (2001)
states that if the economy is normal (not in a crisis),
controlling shareholders tend to increase their CFR,
thus increasing the ratio.
Despite the above, the ratio found in this study
is less than 1, which is in line with Claessens et al.
(1999), and with the presence of a pyramid structure and cross holding between companies, therefore
caused control rights to be greater than cash flow
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2004
2005
2006
2007
Figure 3. Control Rights Concentration Movements

2004

2005

2006

2007

Figure 4. Cash Flow Rights-Control Rights Ratio
rights. This is found especially in Indonesia, Japan,
and Singapore. It is also found that separation of the
management from ownership control is seldom carried out in companies where ownership tends to be
undistributed.
The increase of the control rights also increases
the power to lobby the management in making decisions. It, in turn, increases the possibility of making
decisions which are self beneficial to the controlling
shareholder, such as, setting dividend returns, deciding investment, and appointing company executives.
According to La Porta et al. (2002), the ratio decreases in countries with weak legal protection for
investors and poor corporate governance implementation, thus controlling shareholders are not supervised. Claessens et al. (1999) added that 60% of the
controlling shareholders in Indonesian companies
are part of the elite management.
Claessens et al. (2002) also states that if the State
does not protect ownership rights in the economy,
individual ownership enforcement gains importance. Share ownership structure in itself will determine on which level a company’s contact could and

2008

2008
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Year

Year

would be signed since it will control the ability and
incentive of the owners in exercising their rights.
Based on the above, the CFR/CTR ratio is lower in
an economy which does not enforce ownership protection. Without dependence on the State, controlling shareholders will exercise their power by way
of voting rights and incentives (by way of cash flow
rights) to negotiate and carry out contracts with various stakeholders, consisting of minor shareholders,
managers, employees, suppliers, creditors, and the
government.
The average value of the control variable LEV is
52.77%. This figure suggests that the sample companies, in general, utilize obligations more than equities (Pranoto 2009). On the other hand, the average
value of Size is 14.03, which is the natural logarithm
of the size of a company by total assets. As seen in
the table, company size increases every year:
There are three alternative models in the treatment
of the panel data: (1) Pooled Least Square (PLS)
Model; (2) Fixed Effect Model (FEM) approach;
and, (3) Random Effect Model (REM) approach.
Chow test is used to select either PLS or FEM.
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Table 3. Chow Test Value Summary
Size

Chow Test
ROA

ROE

RRSS

0.951332

3.401703

13.91236

URSS

0.405542

1.180844

N

55

55

2006

13.99818

K

5

5

2007

14.13800

T

5

5

5.43921

7.4918

2008

14.34418

F Stat

1.397441183

1.397441183

Model

Fixed Effect

Fixed Effect

2004

13.79891

2005

Chow Test

Table 4. Hausman Test Value Summary
Description:
Cross-section
random

ROA
Chi-Sq.
Prob.
14.014569
0.0155

ROE
Chi-Sq.
Prob.
23.793486 0.0002

Fixed Effect

Fixed Effect

The test is carried out to compare Chow value and
F-stat.
Based on Table 3, it is seen that Chow value is
greater than F-stat value. As such, the model used
for both proxies is FEM.
After the Chow test was carried out, the FEM will
undergo the Hausman test. The value which must
be considered in the Hausman test is the probability
value of Chi-square.
Based on Table 4, it is seen that Chi-Sq. probability value of both proxies is less than 0.05. As such,
the model used is FEM. Based on both tests, it is
concluded that the model which will be used is FEM.
I will use the formal statistical test in deciding
which model to use since the results are much more
accurate, as opposed to using only formal tests comparing N and T.
The classic assumption test is divided into normality, multi-collinearity, hetero-scedasticity, and
auto-correlation tests. Normality test is carried out
to understand data normality by observing normal
probability plot. If the residual is originated from the
normal distribution, then the distribution value of the
data is situated around the straight line, which is the
normal distribution line (Sarwoko 2005). Casewise
Diagnostics found 11 outliers on the ROE and 15
outliers on the ROA. However, I can only extract 11
outliers from the ROA for the reason that, if viewed
from the normal probability plot, it is already located around the normal distribution line and has
a low standard deviation value. Multi-collinearity

Table 5. Model Selection Summary
Test

Results

Model Used

Chow

Fixed Effect

FEM

Hausman

Fixed Effect

FEM

test is a regression equation phenomenon assumed
to have strong correlations between the independent
variables in the equation (Nachrowi 2006). Multicollienarity detection can be carried out in several
ways, among which is from the Correlation Matrix.
Should the value is less than ±0.8, multicollienarity does not take place (Sarwoko 2005). In the table,
multicollinearity does not take place since there is
no value exceeding ±0.8.
The heteroscedasticity can be left out should the
GLS Gujarati method is used (2003). However, referring to Pranoto (2009), I will apply white crosssection and cross section weight to minimize heteroscedasticity conditions, thus achieving improved
variable significance levels. Variables which are
subject to treatment can be seen in the table. Changes caused by the allowing error variants to be consistent show that there is hetero-scedasticity present
in the model. The auto-correlation test is carried out
by comparing the tables DW-stat and DW (Sarwoko
2005). The DW-stat is then inserted into Table 9.
Based on Table 9, it is seen that autocorrelation is
not present since DW-stat is between the ranges of
1.592 and 2.408.
A. Statistical Model Criteria Tests
Statistical criteria can be viewed from several
regression values, which are R2 value (R2 value reflects the values of related variables in estimation
models) an adjusted R2 F-stat value, and t-stat value.
By using ROA in analysing R2 and adjusted R2
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Table 6. Correlation Matrix Values
Des.
CONS
CTR
CFR_CTR
LEV
Size

CONS
1.000
.193
.395
.113
-.018

CTR

CFR_CTR

LEV

Size

1.000
-.374
-.134
.415

1.000
.190
-.356

1.000
.113

1.000

Table 7. Significance after Treatment
Des.

Before
0.0000
0.0002
0.0834
0.0000
0.0957

CONS?
CTR?
CFR_CTR?
LEV?
SIZE?

ROA

After
0.0000
0.0000
0.0617
0.0000
0.0000

Before
0.0088
0.1455
0.1762
0.1501
0.0833

ROE

After
0.0479
0.0054
0.0022
0.1238
0.0000

Table 8. DW Table Values
N
k
dL (66,5)
dU (66,5)
DW-stat (ROA)
DW-stat (ROE)

Des.

Value
55
5
1.209
1.592
1.681002
1.685599

N = total cross-sections
K = total variables
dL = DW table lower limit
dU = DW table higher upper limit

Table 9. DW-stat and DW Tables Comparison Rules
Autocorrelation
Positive
0

1,209

Unknown
1,592

2

2,408

No autocorrelation
2,791

regression, the value of R2 is found to be 0.903815.
As a dependent variable in the model, profitability
by proxy of ROA describes 90.38% of the model,
while the remaining 9.62% is explained by factors
outside the model. By using ROE in analysing R2,
the value is found to be 0.871322. This indicates that
profitability by proxy of ROE describes 87.13% of
the model, while the remaining 12.87% is explained
by factors outside the model.
Multiple regression analysis (F-stat) is explainable by means of F-stat value of 44.63863 in the ROA
table and zero probability. This value is absolute at
99%, or is classifiable as highly significant. Multiple
regression analysis (F-stat) is explainable by means
of F-stat value of 32.44656 in the ROA table and
zero probablility. This value is less than 1% signifi-

Unknown

Autocorrelation
negative

4

cance, or is classifiable as highly significant. Therefore, concentrated share ownership, concentrated
control rights of controlling shareholders, cash flow
rights-control rights ratio of controlling shareholders, leverage, and company size affects company
profitability significantly.
T-stat analysis will describe the relation of each
independent variable to that of the dependent variables. First, largest concentration of shareholder ownership (CONS). The values of t-stat for the CONS
variable by proxy of ROA and ROE are 4.274283
with zero probability and 1.990055 with 0.0479
probability, respectively. The probability values are
less than 5% significance, or 95% absolute (p-value
is less than 0.05). CONS coefficients are positive
0.036794 and positive 0.077487 for ROA and ROE,
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Table 10. ROA Regression Results Summary
Des.
t-stat

N
R2
Adj. R2
F-stat
Prob. F-stat
DW-stat
Note: ROAit

Assumed
Operator
+
+
+

55
0.924526
0.903815
44.63863
0.000000
1.681002

Var.
CONS?
CTR?
CFR_CTR?
LEV?
SIZE?

Coefficient
0.036794
-0.004535
0.004135
-0.093588
0.004848

t-stat
4.274283
-4.324119
1.878214
-6.683430
9.386189

Prob.
0.0000
0.0000
0.0617
0.0000
0.0000

Table 11. ROE Regression Results Summary
Description:
t-stat

N
R2
Adj. R2
F-stat
Prob. F-stat
DW-stat
Note: ROEit t

Assumed
Operator
+
+
+

55
0.899030
0.871322
32.44656
0.000000
1.685599

Var.

Coefficient

t-stat

Prob.

CONS?
CTR?
CFR_CTR?
LEV?
SIZE?

0.077487
-0.004347
0.040860
-0.043663
0.011401

1.990055
-2.809429
3.092749
-1.544895
4.516450

0.0479
0.0054
0.0022
0.1238
0.0000

respectively. Thus, a 1% increase of ownership concentration would increase ROA and ROE by 3.68%
and 7.75%, respectively. The results support the assumption that if ownership is relatively distributed,
shareholder supervision tends to be weak due to poor
supervision by the minor shareholders. Minor shareholders receive small returns from the company, but
nonetheless they are liable to supervision costs, thus
they are lack of interest in supervising the company.
Should every minor shareholder acts the same, then
there will be no supervision against the management
of the company. Ineffective management supervision allows the opportunity for managerial discretion, where managers invest in unprofitable highrisk projects, for instance. Such behaviour occurs in
the supervision takeover from minor shareholders
by company mangers (Joh 2001).
This positive and significant relation affects subsidiaries since companies held by the biggest shareholders expect a transfer of knowledge within their
circles. The relations between a parent company and
its subsidiary encourage company owners to transfer his resources to the subsidiaries, consequently
allowing the subsidiaries to be highly profitable,
which, in turn, affect the parent company.

Second, control right concentration of controlling shareholders (CTR). The values of t-stat for
the CTR variable by proxy of ROA are -4.324119
and -2.809429 with zero probability, which is significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%. As for ROE, the value
is 0.0054, significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%. The coefficients are -0.004535 and -0.004347. Thus, a 1%
CTR concentration increase will decrease ROA and
ROE by -0.45% and -0.43%, respectively. Consequently, controlling shareholders control rights concentration significantly and negatively affects company profitability. The findings of this study support
the notion that increased concentration of the ownership increases company profitability. However, if
the increase is followed by an increase in control
rights, by means of the pyramid structure or cross
holding, it decreases company profitability because
company control is concentrated at the shareholders. Accordingly, their position within the company
gains significance, allowing them to use the company resources for personal gain, which, of course,
decreases company profits.
Third, cash flow rights-control rights (CFR/CTR)
ratio. The t-stat value, coefficient, and probability of
CFR/CTR of the controlling shareholders by proxy
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of ROA are 1.878214, 0.004135, and 0.0617, respectively. The values are 5% insignificant. As for
the ROE, the t-stat value, coefficient, and probability are 3.092749, 0.040869, and 0.0022. The values
are significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%. As such, a 1%
CFR/CTR increases ROA and ROE by 0.41% and
4.08%. The conclusion of the study indicates that
the incentive to expropriate by proxy of cash flow
to control rights of the controlling shareholders has
positive effects to profitability by 10%. CFR/CTR
reflects the incentive of the controlling shareholders to expropriate company assets. A high CFR will
decrease the incentive to transfer company resources
for personal interests (Joh 2001). The importance of
high cash flow rights is due to the belief of the minor
shareholders, that company profitability is affected if
the controlling shareholders use company assets for
personal interests. Per se, a positive relation between
profitability and cash flow rights of the controlling
shareholders is established. The concentrated cash
flow rights of the controlling shareholder made it
possible to increase profitability and unite the interests of the major and minor shareholders (Joh 2001).
In its association with investment opportunities,
should a controlling shareholder has a low CFR, he
will not gain any profit in future investments. As
a result, he tends to expropriate assets rather than
invest resources in projects of positive NPV, even
if there are other investment opportunities. With a
concentrated CFR, he would wait for a profitable
investment in the future and expropriate less in the
meantime.
Therefore, ownership structure determines controlling shareholders’ incentive; the greater the
CFR, the greater the lost a controlling shareholder
would suffer should he expropriate from the company. Claessens et al. (2002) states that controlling
shareholders would expropriate more should there is
sufficient compensation from the expropriation. The
compensation is inversed to lower CFR to CTR ratio
and decreases CFR. However, the opportunity to expropriate reduces with the implementation of better
CG practices. Sound CG practices, the presence of
an independent commissioner and equal protection
for every shareholder, for instance, affects sound internal control mechanisms and in turn prevents controlling shareholders to expropriate.
Fourth, leverage (LEV) and size. The t-stat values
of the control variable LEV to ROA are -6.683430
and 0.0000 profitability, significant at 1% with a coefficient of -0.093588. The t-stat value to ROA is
-1.544895, which is insignificant at any rate, and a
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coefficient of -0.043663. Therefore, the LEV variable negatively affects company profitability. This
suggests that companies which tend to use leverages
as a source of funding show lower profitability.
The negative effect of LEV is caused by the notion
that the more debts a company has, the more interest
it has to pay. This negatively affects its profitability.
Should the ROA of the company exceed its interest;
the company acquires more funds than it has to pay
to its creditors. In turn, this allows for capital surplus
for the company owners, who are the shareholders
(Joh, 2001). Hence, the significance of leverages to
ROE depends on asset returns and interest rates.
In addition, the negative effects of increasing
debts are caused by the exposure of the company to
bankruptcy risks and decreased future investment
flexibility due to current debts. In other words, the
company will not be flexible in its investment policy
should it acquire future funding by means of current
debts.
For the second control variable, size, the t-stat
values are 9.386189 and 4.516450, significant at
1% and a coefficient of 0.004848 and 0.011401.
As such, the size of a company has a positive and
significant relation to profitability. The positive relation can be explained as follows: companies of great
sizes tend to increase its economic scales for better
growth. For that end, they need to employ competent
and qualified managers, in addition to implementing
procedures which boost productivity. As a result, the
measures ameliorate company operations, increasing its efficiency and profitability. In accordance to
the findings of Joh (2001), the size of a company
determines investment opportunities, thus has an effect in company returns.
CONCLUSION
The study finds that ownership concentration as
a variable in ownership structure, by proxy of major share ownership, has significant, positive effects in company profitability. As for the incentive
to expropriate variable, by proxy of control rights,
has significant, negative effects to profitability since
control is concentrated in the shareholders, thus
placing them of influential positions allowing for
personal interests. This, in turn, decreases company
profitability. By proxy of cash flow to control rights
ratio, controlling shareholders affects profitability
positively and significantly. The reason for such is
because greater cash flow rights increase the losses
a controlling shareholder suffers should he expropri-
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ate the company. Nonetheless, expropriation chances are decreased with the implementation of better
company administration, which results in a better
internal control mechanism and prevents controlling
shareholders to expropriate. Accordingly, by using
both proxies, it is concluded that the incentive to expropriate variable can affect positively or negatively,
depending on control rights and cash flow rights of
the controlling shareholders.
The results of the study may be a consideration for
investors or securities issuers. In considering which
share to be added to their portfolios, investors have
to consider the ownership structure of a company as
a decisive factor in the administration of a company.
Moreover, investors have to consider profitability,
especially ROA and ROE, before investing in certain
shares. As for securities issuers, in order to achieve
better company performance figures, especially in
increasing company profitability, they have to consider the ownership structure, so that a mutually
beneficial relation between the stakeholders of the
company, particularly the controlling shareholders
and minor shareholders, in the administration of a
company is established. Securities issuers also have
to consider profitability because it is a valid measure
of company operations, in addition to comparing alternative investments along with the risks involved.
This study, along with other studies on ownership
structure and company financial performance which
illustrates effective corporate governance mechanisms by means of descriptive statistics analysis, has
its limitations. In general, this study has to be postponed from time to time in finding whether ownership concentration as a variable in ownership structure, by proxy of major share ownership, has significant, positive effects in company profitability (the
study was carried out between 2009 and 2010). Additionally, studies on corporate governance consists
only of figures of the effectiveness of the corporate
governance mechanism. In such mostly quantitative studies, qualitative questions, for instance how
ownership structure formation variables influences
company profitability, are seldom left unanswered.
On that basis, an in-depth analysis is suggested to
complement this quantitative study. The analysis
should explore quantitative aspects of the reality of
corporate governance, thus obtaining results which
are useful for further studies.

REFERENCE
Berle, Adolf A., and Gardiner C. Means. 1932. The
Modern Corporation and Private Property . New
Brunswick, N.J. USA.

Volume 17, Number 3

Claessens, Stjin, Djankov, Simeon, and Larry H. P. Lang.
2000. The Separation of Ownership and Control in East
Asian Corporation. Journal of Economic Literature
Classification: G32, L22.
____. 1999. Expropriation of Minority Shareholders in
East Asia. NBER.
Cooper, D.R., and Schindler, P.S. 2006. Business Research
Methods (9th ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill/Irwin.
Denis, D.J., & Denis, D.K. 1994. Majority ownermanagers and organizational efficiency. Journal of
Corporate Finance, 1: 91-118.
Cueto, Diego. 2007. Corporate Governance and
Ownership Structure in Emerging
Markets:
Evidence from Latin America. Dissertation Proposal.
Earle, John S., Csaba Kucsera, and Almos Telegdy. 2004.
Ownership Concentration and Corporate Performance
on the Budapest Stock Exchange: Do Too Many Cooks
Spoil the Goulash? Journal of Economic Literature
classification: G32, G34.
Fan, Joseph P. H. and T. J. Wong. 2000. Corporate
Ownership and the Informativeness of Accounting
Earnings in East Asia. HKUST Accounting
Symposium.
Gedajlovic, E. & D. Shapiro. (1998). Management and
Ownership Effects: Evidence from FiveCountries.
Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 19: 533-553.
Gujarati, D.N. 2003. Basic Econometrics, 4th edition.
New York: McGraw-Hill/Irwin.
Gutierrez, Maria, and Josep A. Tribo (2002), “Multiple
Large Shareholders in CorporateControl: Evidence
for Spain.” Unpublished working paper, Universidad
Carlos III de Madrid.
Joh, Sung Wook. 2001. Corporate Governance and
Firm Profitability: Evidence from Korea before the
Economic Crisis. Journal of Financial Economics.
JEL classification: G3.
Kapelyushnikov, R. 2000. Largest and Dominant Owners
in Russian Industry: Evidence from REB Monitoring).
Voprosy Economiki, No 1.
La Porta, Rafael and Robert Vishny. 2002. Investor
Protection and Corporate Valuation. The Journal of
Finance, Vol. 57, No. 3, 1147-1170.
Mitton, Todd. 2002. A cross-firm Analysis of the Impact
of Corporate Governance on the East Asian Financial
Crisis. Journal of Financial Economics.
Nachrowi, Nachrowi D. and Hardius Usman. 2006.
Pendekatan Populer and Praktis Ekonometrika Untuk
Analisis Ekonomi and Keuangan. Jakarta: Lembaga
Penerbit Fakultas Ekonomi Universitas Indonesia.
Sarwoko. 2005. Dasar-dasar Ekonometrika. Yogyakarta:
ANDI OFFSET.
Shleifer, Andrei and Robert W. Vishny. 1996. A Survey of

WASEF & KUSUMASTUTI, OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND PERFORMANCE

Corporate Governance. NBER Working Paper Series:
5554.
Syafruddin, Muchamad. 2006. Pengaruh Struktur
Kepemilikan Perusahaan pada Kinerja: Faktor
Ketidakpastian Lingkungan sebagai Pemoderasi.
JAAI, Vol.
10, No. 1, 85-99.
Pranoto, Teddy. 2009. Analisis Kepemilikan Saham
and Konsentrasi Kepemilikan Terhadap Struktur
Modal serta Dampaknya kepada Kinerja Keuangan
Perusahaan. Thesis at the Department of Accounting,
School of Economics at Universitas Indonesia. Not
published.

249

Sari, Putri Gita. 2004. Analisa Hubungan Struktur
Kepemilikan Saham terhadap Kinerja Perusahaanperusahaan Indonesia. Thesis at the Department
of Management Sciences, School of Economics,
Postgraduate, Universitas Indonesia. Not published.
Utama, Cynthia Apriani. 2006. Pengaruh Transaksi
Internal, Corporate Governance, Status Konglomerasi,
and Struktur Kepemilikan terhadap Reaksi Pasar
Akibat Pengumuman Keputusan Investasi Perusahaan.
Dissertation at the Department of Management
Sciences, School of Economics, Postgraduate,
Universitas Indonesia. Not published

